## Introduction to z-Tree

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## How well do you know zTree?

1. Never used it
2. Played with it a bit
3. Used it to run experiments
4. Used it to program and run experiments
zTree online support

- zTree hompage:
- http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree/index.php
- zTree Wiki
- https://www.uzh.ch/iew/ztree/ssl-dir/wiki/
- zTree mailing list
- go to https://lists.uzh.ch/iew.lists.uzh.ch/sympa/info/ztree and click on the 'Subscribe' link


## zTree components

## Treatment

- Arranged in a tree structure (the stage tree)
- One background stage
- Set number of subjects, groups, periods, exchange rate
- Default screens
- Treatment variables
- Any number of normal stages
- Each stage corresponds (roughly) to one screen



## zTree components

## Stage

－Properties马
－When does it start and end
－Programs ${ }^{5}$
－Set and change variables
－Two screens
－Active：for input and display
－Waiting：display only $\square$
－Screens contain boxes $\equiv$ E that in turn contain
－items $\square \square$ and buttons $\square$

```
\square.C Background
    婛 globals
    |
    E|}\mathrm{ summary
    E
    E) session
    |
OMgobals.do {...}
        A = 1;
        B=2;
        Pa=0.75;
        MaxC = 50;
        Prize = 100;
    \square}\mathrm{ Active screen
        \square \mp@code { H e a d e r }
    \square Waitingscreen
        囯 Text
        \squareD Please wait until the experiment continues.
G.马 Voting=|=(30)
    # subjects.do { Type = if(random0<Pa,A,B); ...}
    #S subjects.do { Na= count(Type==A); ...}
    \square}\mathrm{ Active screen
    日目 Standard
        \square Your type is:: OUT( Type)
        \square\our cost of voting is:: OUT(C)
        \square
        Number of voters of type A:: OUT(Na)
        Number of voters of type B:: OUT(Nb )
        \square
        \squareWould you like to vote for your type or to abstain?: IN( Vote )
        \square O K
    Waitingscreen
```


## zTree components

## Tables

－Data are stored in tables．Mostly in
－subjects table
－One row per subject
－globals table
－One row per treatment （i．e．，same value for all subjects）
－A new subjects table and a new globals table are created in every period
－Other tables
－summary，contracts，session， and logfile
－Other tables can be accessed with the table．tablefunction

| 图 subjects table |  |  |  |  | －－－区 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Period | Subject | Group | Profit | TotalProfit | Participate |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 图 globals table |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Period | NumPeriods | RepeatTr | reatment |
|  |  | 1 | 1 |  | 0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Programs

－Programs are executed at the beginning of a stage or when buttons are clicked
－Calculations are done by z－Tree and then sent to the z－Leafs
－Programs are executed row by row in the table they are called （i．e．subject by subject in the subjects table）

## zTree components

## Boxes

- Box = rectangular area of the screen containing stuff
- They are positioned over each other
- standard box, header box, help box, grid box, history box, chat box, plot box



## Positioning boxes

- Distances can be set as \% of the screen or in pixels



## Display condition

- Makes boxes appear (when true) or disappear (when false)


## zTree components

## Boxes

- Box = rectangular area of the screen containing stuff
- They are positioned over each other
- standard box, header box, help box, grid box, history box, chat box, plot box



## Useful tip

- Use container boxes
- rectangular area containing other boxes
- lets you move many boxes at the same time and keep things in place with different resolutions



## zTree components

## Game 1

## Period 1

Number of remaining dividend payments:
10
Number of remaining shares: 2
Amount of remaining cash: $\mathbf{\$ 4 1 . 0 0}$

10 seconds left!


## How to build a test environment

Unzip zTreeMaterials.zip into a folder.

- Can be found at http://ereuben.net/teach/zTreeMaterials.zip

Open zTree with the batch file: "openztree.bat"
Open the file: "Open Zleafs.exe"

- Set as many zLeafs as necessary
- If needed, change screen resolution and other options



## Exp. 1: Rational turnout

Voters are randomly selected to prefer A or B

- Probability of preferring a $p_{A}>1 / 2$

Voters can vote for $A, B$, or abstain

- They get 100 if their preference wins and 0 otherwise
- Voting is costly: costs are drawn from a uniform distribution $\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}} \in[0,50]$
To have a function al program we need:
- Set variables in the background stage
- Two other stages
- Voting stage: voters are told their preference and make their decision
- Result stage: voters are informed of the election's outcome


## Creating variables

Variables are defined the first time they are referenced in a table

- They are always a real number

Defining treatment variables in the background stage: globals.do\{

$$
\begin{aligned}
& A=1 ; \\
& B=2 ; \\
& P a=0.75 ; \\
& \text { MaxC }=50 ; \\
& \text { Prize }=100 ;
\end{aligned}
$$

## Functions

There is a good number of functions that can be used for programming:

Draw types and costs:
subjects.do\{
Type $=$ if $(\operatorname{random}()<\mathrm{Pa}, \mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B})$;
$C=$ round $($ random( $) * M a x C, 1)$;
\}

## Table functions

## Syntax 1: table function( expression )

- e.g. number of voters and the average cost of voting: subjects.do\{

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{N}=\text { count(); } \\
& \text { AvgC = average(C); }
\end{aligned}
$$

Syntax 2: table function( condition, expression )

- e.g. number of As and the average cost of voting for As: subjects.do\{

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{Na}=\operatorname{count}(\text { Type==A); } \\
& \text { AvgCa = average(Type==A, C); }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Table functions

## Programs are run sequentially per row

 subjects.do\{Type $=\mathrm{if}($ random ()$<\mathrm{Pa}, \mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B})$;
$\mathrm{C}=$ round $(\operatorname{random}()$ * MaxC, 1);
$\mathrm{Na}=$ count(Type==A);
$\mathrm{Nb}=$ count(Type==B);
\}

Incorrect!

## Table functions

## Programs are run sequentially per row

 subjects.do\{Type $=$ if( random() < $\mathrm{Pa}, \mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}) ;$
$\mathrm{C}=$ round $($ random() * MaxC, 1);
\}
subjects.do\{
$\mathrm{Na}=$ count(Type==A);
$\mathrm{Nb}=\operatorname{count(Type==B);~}$
\}

## Correct!

## Input and output of variables

Items are used for the input and output of variables

- Label (text displayed)
- Variable (for input or output)
- Layout:
- numbers - radio buttons
- check boxes - sliders
- scrollbars - text

Note

- If the item is used for input we also need a button


## Input and output of variables

## Variables integrated into text

- If instead of displaying "Your type is: A" you want to display "If A wins you earn 100 points but if $B$ wins you earn 0 points" then type the following in the label box
<>|f <Type | !text: A="A"; B="B";> wins you earn 100 points but if <Type |!text: $A=" B$ "; $B=" A$ "; $>$ wins you earn 0 points
RTF is supported so you can do a lot of stuff
- To display "Your profit in this period was -5.00 points" where the profits are bold only when negative then type <>\{\rtf Your \i profit \i0 in this period was
<Profit |!text: 1=""; $-1=$ " $\backslash \mathrm{b}$ ";><Profit |0.01> points
<Profit |!text: 1=""; -1="\b0";>\}


## globals table

Use the globals table when a variable is the same value for all subjects
globals.do\{
Tiebreak $=$ if(random()<0.5, A, B);
\}
subjects.do\{
Votesa $=$ count(Vote==1 \& Type==A);
Votesb $=$ count(Vote==1 \& Type==B);
Winner = if(Votesa > Votesb, A, 0) + if(Votesa < Votesb, B, 0)

+ if(Votesa == Votesb, Tiebreak, 0);
Profit $=$ MaxC + if(Winner $==$ Type, Prize, 0$)-$ C*Vote; $^{*}$


## Groups

In most experiments subjects are divided into groups

Let's redo the rational turnout experiment but with random allocation of voters to groups of 5 and then

- Voters are randomly selected to prefer A or B
- Probability of preferring a $p_{A}>1 / 2$
- Voters can vote for $A, B$, or abstain
- They get 100 if their preference wins and 0 otherwise
- Voting is costly: drawn from a uniform distribution $c_{i} \in[0,50]$


## Groups

The variable Group determines the group matching

- The number of groups can be set in the background stage
There are menu commands for different types of matchings (treatment menu):
- Partner
- Stranger
- absolute Stranger
- typed absolute Stranger

Important:

- Before running an experiment, check the parameter table (treatment menu)


## Groups

## The Group variable can also be changed:

- Manually in the parameter table
- Double-click on each cell and set group
- Through a program in the background stage, e.g., subjects.do\{

Group = 1;
Group $=$ if( Subject >= 6 \& Subject <= 15, 2, Group);
Group $=$ if( Subject $>15,3$, Group);
\}

## Common matching protocols

- Partners in groups of size $N$, e.g. $N=4$ :
globals.do\{
N = 4;
\}
subjects.do\{
Group = roundup( Subject / N, 1);
\}


## Common matching protocols

- Strangers in groups of size $N$, e.g. $\mathrm{N}=4$ :
globals.do\{
N = 4;
\}
subjects.do\{
RndNum = random();
\}
subjects.do\{
Group = roundup( count(RndNum <= :RndNum) / N, 1);
\}


## Common matching protocols

- Strangers within matching groups of size $M$ and in groups of size $N$, e.g. $\mathrm{M}=10 \& N=2$ :
globals.do\{
$\mathrm{M}=10$;
N = 2;
\}
subjects.do\{
MatchGroup = roundup( Subject / M, 1);
RndNum $=$ random ()$+$ MatchGroup;
\}
subjects.do\{
Group = roundup( count(RndNum <=:RndNum) / N, 1);
\}


## same() function

## same( ) is the table function used to make group

 calculations- e.g. to count the total number of voters, the number of A voters and the number of $B$ voters within each group subjects.do\{

$$
\begin{aligned}
& N=\text { count( same(Group) ); } \\
& \mathrm{Na}=\operatorname{count}(\text { same(Group) \& Type==A); } \\
& \mathrm{Nb}=\text { count ( same(Group) \& Type==B); }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Scope operator

## Alternatively, one can use the scope operator ":"

subjects.do\{
N = count( Group == :Group );
$\mathrm{Na}=\operatorname{count}($ Group $==$ :Group \& Type==A);
Nb = count(Group == :Group \& Type==B);
\}

## Scope operator

## Scope operator gives you more flexibility

- e.g. rank voters in the group according to their cost subjects.do\{
RankC = count( same(Group) \& C <= C);
\}


## Incorrect!

subjects.do\{
RankC = count( same(Group) \& C <= :C);
\}
Correct!

## Exp. 2: An ultimatum game

## Subjects are matched in pairs

- Each pair has 1 proposer and 1 responder
- Proposers offer responders $x$ points from $y$ available points
- Responders can accept or reject the offer
- If the responder accepts:
- Proposers earn: $\pi_{P}=y-x$
- Responders earn: $\pi_{R}=x$
- If the responder rejects:
- Both earn 0 points

Play for $t$ periods

- Random matching and random assignment of roles


## Assigning types

Player types can be assigned by programming them

- e.g., to randomly allocate one proposer and one responder per pair

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { subjects.do\{ } \\
& \quad \text { RndNum = random(); }
\end{aligned}
$$

\}
subjects.do\{
RndOther $=$ find(same(Group) \& not( same(Subject) ) , RndNum);
Proposer = if( RndOther > RndNum, 1, 0);
\}
Or ... use the parameter table (less flexible)

- period parameters, subject parameters, period $\times$ subject parameters


## Common matching protocols

- Typed partners in groups of size $N$ and with $N$ types of players where each group has one player of each type and types are constant across periods, e.g. $\mathrm{N}=2$ :

```
globals.do{
    N = 2;
}
subjects.do{
    Group = roundup( Subject / N, 1);
    Type = mod(Subject - 1, N) + 1;
}
```


## Common matching protocols

- Typed partners in groups of size $N$ and with $N$ types of players where each group has one player of each type and types are randomly redrawn every period, e.g. $\mathrm{N}=2$ :

```
globals.do{
    N = 2;
}
subjects.do{
    RndNum = random();
    Group = roundup( Subject / N, 1);
}
subjects.do{
    Type = mod(count(same(Group) & RndNum <= :RndNum) - 1, N) + 1;
}
```


## Common matching protocols

- Typed strangers in groups of size $N$ and with $N$ types of players where each group has one player of each type and types are randomly redrawn every period, e.g. $\mathrm{N}=2$ :

```
globals.do{
    N = 2;
}
subjects.do{
    RndNum = random();
}
subjects.do{
    Group = roundup( count(RndNum <= :RndNum) / N, 1);
}
subjects.do{
Type = mod(count(same(Group) & RndNum <= :RndNum) - 1, N) + 1;
}
```


## Common matching protocols

- Typed strangers in groups of size $N$ and with $N$ types of players where each group has one player of each type and types are constant every period, e.g. $N=2$ :

```
globals.do{
    N = 2;
    NG = subjects.maximum(Subject) / N;
}
subjects.do{
    Type = mod(Subject - 1, N) + 1;
    RndNum = random();
}
subjects.do{
    Group = mod(count(same(Type) & RndNum <= :RndNum) - 1, NG) +
    1;
}
```


## Common matching protocols

- Typed strangers within matching groups of size $M$ in groups of size $N$ and with $N$ types of players where each group has one player of each type and types are randomly redrawn every period, e.g. $\mathrm{M}=10 \& \mathrm{~N}=2$ :

```
globals.do{
    M = 10;
    N = 2;
}
subjects.do{
    MatchGroup = roundup( Subject / M, 1);
    RndNum = random() + MatchGroup;
}
subjects.do{
    Group = roundup( count(RndNum <= :RndNum) / N, 1);
}
subjects.do{
    Type = mod(count(same(Group) & RndNum <= :RndNum) - 1, N) + 1;
}
```


## Common matching protocols

- Typed strangers within matching groups of size $M$ in groups of size $N$ and with $N$ types of players where each group has one player of each type and types are constant every period, e.g. $\mathrm{M}=10 \& \mathrm{~N}=2$ :

```
globals.do{
    M = 10;
    N = 2;
    NG = subjects.maximum(Subject) / N;
}
subjects.do{
    MatchGroup = roundup( Subject / M, 1);
    Type = mod(count(same(MatchGroup) & Subject <= : Subject) - 1, N) + 1;
    RndNum = random() + MatchGroup;
}
subjects.do{
    Group = mod(count(same(Type) & RndNum <= :RndNum) - 1, NG) + 1;
}
```


## Sequential vs. simultaneous screens

Rational turnout
Voting decision

Profit display

## Ultimatum game

## Proposer offer

waiting

Proposer profit display
waiting
Responder acceptance

Responder profit display

## Participate

## The variable Participate determines who enters a stage

- Enter stage: Participate = 1 .
- Skip stage: Participate $=0$.
- At every stage, Participate resets to 1


## For the ultimatum game use either

- Participate = if (Proposer ==1,1,0);
- Participate $=$ if $($ Proposer $==0,1,0)$;

```
+ Background
- 量 Proposer =|=(60)N
subjects.do {...}
Rand = random0;
    ~ subjects.do {...}
        RandOther = find( same(Group) & not(sc
        Proposer = if(RandOther > Rand, 1, 0);
                Participate = if(Proposer == 1, 1, 0);
    \square Active screen
        # Standard
        \square\ You are a proposer.
        \squareThe total amount of points to divide a
        \square] How many points do you offer to the
        \square \text { Ready}
```

```
        Waitingscreen
-B Responder =|=(60)N
    -5 subjects.do {...}
        Participate = if(Proposer == 0, 1, 0);
        Offer = find(same(Group) & Proposer =
    \square}\mathrm{ Active screen
        目 Standard
            \square\ You are a responder.
            \square] The total amount of points to divide a
            \squareD Points offered to you by the proposer
            Do you accept or reject the offer?: IN
            \square \text { Ready}
```

```Waitingscreen
\(\square\) Profit Display \(=\mid=(30) \mathrm{N}\)
- subjects.do \{...\}
Accept \(=\) find( same (Group ) \& Proposer
Profit \(=\) Accept \({ }^{\text {if }}\) (Proposer \(==1\), Pie -
- - Active screen
I \({ }^{\text {S }}\) Standard
Waitingscreen
```


## Exp. 3: Another ultimatum game

## Proposers offer responders $x$ points from $y$ available

 points- Responders state what is the minimum acceptable offer
- If the offer $\geq$ minimum acceptable offer:
- Proposers earn: $\pi_{P}=y-x$
- Responders earn: $\pi_{R}=x$
- If the offer < minimum acceptable offer:
- Both earn 0 points

This is an example of the strategy method

## Stage: start options

## To make proposers and responders decide simultaneously

## Stage start property



- Wait for all
- general case
- Start is possible
- simultaneous stages
- stages that do not depend on other participants

```
+M Background
- Proposer =|= (60)N
    S}\mathrm{ subjects.do {...}
        Rand = random(;
    ~N
                            RandOther = find( same(Group) & not( sa
        Proposer = if(RandOther > Rand, 1, 0);
                            Participate = if(Proposer == 1, 1,0);
    \square-D Active screen
    - EB Standard
    \square You are a proposer.
    \square \mp@code { T h e ~ t o t a l ~ a m o u n t ~ o f ~ p o i n t s ~ t o ~ d i v i d e ~ a }
    \square How many points do you offer to the
    Ready
```

```
            Waitingscreen
- Responder -= (60)N
    N}\mathrm{ subjects.do {...}
                            Participate = if(Proposer ==0,1,0);
    \square-D Active screen
    ### Standard
                            \square \mp@code { Y o u ~ a r e ~ a ~ r e s p o n d e r . }
                            \square \square \text { The total amount of points to divide a}
                                \square \square \text { What is the smallest offer that you wo}
                Ready
```

```
            Waitingscreen
马 Profit Display =|= (30)N
    Subjects.do {...}
            MinAccept = find( same(Group ) & Propos
            Offer = find( same(Group ) & Proposer 
            Accept = if( Offer >= MinAccept, 1, 0);
            Profit = Accept * if(Proposer == 1, Pie
    -
            Active screen
    +
    \equivE Standard
    Waitingscreen
```


## Exp. 4: A very simple English auction

## Subjects are all buyers

- Subjects get a (random) private value for the auctioned good
- Subjects make bids
- Winner pays the second highest price
- The auction is terminated after a fixed timeout
- Winner gets: $\pi^{B}=y+v_{i}-b_{2}$
- Others get: $\pi^{s}=y$

For market experiments we need to use the

- contracts table
- new types of boxes: contract creation box, contract list box, and contract grid box


## Contracts table

The contracts table has a flexible number of records (records can be added)

- New records are created in contract creation boxes
- or with the new command: contracts.new $\{x=1$; \}

| Buyer | Bid | Order |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |

## Contracts table

The contracts table has a flexible number of records (records can be added)

- New records are created in contract creation boxes
- or with the new command: contracts.new $\{x=1$; \}

| Buyer | Bid | Order |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Subject 2 makes a bid (highest bid) |  |  |
|  | 10 | 1 |

## Contracts table

## The contracts table has a flexible number of records (records can be added)

- New records are created in contract creation boxes
- or with the new command: contracts.new\{ $x=1$; \}

| Buyer | Bid | Order |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | 10 | 2 |
| 5 | 12 | 1 |

Subject 2 makes a bid (second highest bid)
Subject 5 makes a bid (highest bid)

## Contracts table

## The contracts table has a flexible number of records (records can be added)

- New records are created in contract creation boxes
- or with the new command: contracts.new $\{x=1$; \}

| Buyer | Bid | Order |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | 10 | 3 |
| 5 | 12 | 2 |
| 4 | 15 | 1 |

Subject 2 makes a bid
Subject 5 makes a bid (second highest bid)
Subject 4 makes a bid (highest bid)

## Contracts table

## The contracts table has a flexible number of records (records can be added)

- New records are created in contract creation boxes
- or with the new command: contracts.new $\{x=1$; \}

| Buyer | Bid | Order |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | 10 | 4 |
| 5 | 12 | 3 |
| 4 | 15 | 2 |
| 2 | 17 | 1 |

Subject 2 makes a bid Subject 5 makes a bid

Subject 5 makes a bid (second highest bid) Subject 2 makes another bid (highest offer)

## Contracts table

## The contents of the contracts table are displayed with a contracts list box or with a contracts grid box



## Exp. 5: A continuous public good game

In each period each subject gets $\mathbf{2 0}$ points.

- Points can be kept or invested in a public good and each point invested in the public good pays 0.5 to everyone
- The profit of each subject is:

$$
\pi_{i}=20-c_{i}+0.5 \times \sum_{j} c_{j}
$$

- There are 90 sec to make non-binding contributions and contributions become binding when the time expires or when the subject chooses to commit him/herself
- Contributions are observed in real-time by everyone


## Exp. 5: A continuous public good game

Auction


## More contracts table

Note that the contracts table can also be used for interaction within the same screen.

- Use the new command to create the table
- Use contract grid boxes
- Important: Changes to variables during the screen are NOT recorded in the data


## Other features

## Programming

- Loops: while( condition ) \{ statements; \}

Complex move structures

- goto next stage if ...

Treatments with indefinite length

- end with a given probability
- end when a specific action is taken Graphics
- Charts
- Display Pictures/Videos

Communication

- Chat box


## Questionnaires

Must be run so that the payoff file is written.
Questions with no consequence on payoff.

- Different formats for the questions.
- Layout is not screen oriented: indefinite end with scrollbar.
- Text entry possible.

Typical Questionnaires:

- Address form (writes the payment file)
- Questions concerning their strategies
- Profit display
- Goodbye screen


## Planning a simple session

Welcome treatment (welcome.ztt)

- Set the show-up fee
- Control questions

Public goods experiment (pg.ztt)

- The main treatment

Ultimatum game (ug.ztt)

- A second treatment

Questionnaires and payment (end.ztq)

- payment file

