Online Supplementary Materials for: Taste for competition and the gender gap among young business professionals

ABSTRACT

This document contains the supplementary materials for the paper Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015). It is organized as follows: Section SM1 describes the procedures used to conduct the experiment and survey, including a sample of the instructions used to elicit taste for competition; Section SM2 presents a detailed analysis of whether MBAs for whom earnings data is available vary systematically from MBAs for whom it is not; Section SM3 contains the complete regressions of the determinants of earnings; Section SM4 describes in detail the robustness checks for the determinants of earnings that are reported in the paper but are not fully described due to space constraints.

SM1. Procedures for the experiment and survey

This section is based on Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008). It describes the procedures used to conduct the survey and the experiment. We concentrate on the parts of the survey and experiment that are relevant to the paper. Further details can be found in Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008).

SM1.1. The survey

Participants completed the online survey in the fall of 2006. The deadline to complete the survey was the day participants took part in the experiment. Completing the survey was a requirement to pass one of the MBA core courses and took approximately one hour. The survey included questions on demographic characteristics as well as standard questionnaires of personality traits. Below, we describe the four survey measures used in the paper. The complete survey questions are available in Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008).

CRT

We measured the participants' tendency to suppress an intuitive wrong answer in favor of the reflective right answer with a variation of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) used by Frederik

(2005). To simplify the original test, we conducted a pilot study using other MBA students and selected the four most challenging questions of the ten suggested by Frederik (2005). Specifically, we used the following four questions:

- A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
- If you flipped a fair coin 3 times, what is the probability that it would land "heads" at least once?
- If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
- Two cars are on a collision course, travelling towards each other in the same lane. Car A is traveling 70 miles an hour. Car B is traveling 80 miles an hour. How far apart are the cars one minute before they collide?

Empathizing

According to Baron-Cohen (2002), the ability to empathize is one of the most important determinants of gender differences in the workplace. To measure this ability, we use the "reading the mind in the eyes" test of Baron-Cohen et al. (2001), which consists of correctly recognizing the emotions of various individuals by looking at pictures of their eyes.

Self-efficacy

We measured self-efficacy with the scale proposed by Sherer et al. (1982). Specifically, we asked participants whether they agree or disagree with the statement "Failure just makes me try harder." Responses were collected in a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "totally disagree" to "totally agree."

Religiosity

To measure religiosity we asked participants to answer the yes/no question "Are you religious now?"

SM1.2. The experiment

The experiment was run in October 2006 in four sessions of around 140 participants. The experiment lasted around 90 minutes. As the survey, participation in the experiment was a requirement of one of the MBAs' core courses. The experiment was programmed and run using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).

The experiment consisted of eight parts: three decision problems and five games. Participants played the eight parts in the following order: lottery with losses, asset market game, trust game, taste for competition game, chocolate auction, social dilemma game, lottery without losses, and discount rate elicitation task. The instructions for each part were given before the start of the respective part (the only exception being the instructions of the asset market game, which they received before their arrival). Importantly, participants received no information about the outcome of the games or lotteries during the experiment. Instead, they received feedback on their performance in specific games and on the behavior of other participants a few days later through an email.

Participants received a $20 show-up fee, which could be used to cover potential losses during the experiment. In addition, participants were paid the amount they earned in one randomly chosen part (the randomization was done among six parts since the lottery with losses and the discount rate elicitation task were always paid). Participants who earned more than show-up fee were paid with a check delivered to their mailbox. Including the show-up fee, participants earned on average $99 (the standard deviation was $63).

Next, we describe the five parts of the experiment used in the paper. The lottery with losses, the asset market game, and the chocolate auction, as well as further details such as the instructions used are available in Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008).

Risk aversion coefficient

To measure risk aversion, participants made 15 choices, one of which would be randomly selected for payment. Each choice was between a lottery that paid either $0 or $200 each with ½ probability and certain amount $\$x \in \{50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100, 105, 110, 115, 120\}$.

In the paper, we use the 15 choices to determine each participant's risk aversion coefficient. Namely, we assume participants possess a utility function of the form $u(c) = c^{1-\rho}/(1-\rho)$ and use smallest value of x at which participants switch from the certain amount to the lottery to calculate ρ. Participants who always choose the certain amount (8.8%) are assigned a ρ that would make them switch when $x = 45$ and participants who always choose the lottery (2.1%) are assigned a ρ that would make them switch at $x = 125$. For a small fraction of participants (4.9%), their choices are not consistent with expected utility maximization (i.e., they switch more than once). As is common in the

literature, for these participants we calculate their risk aversion coefficient based on their first switching point.

Discount rate

To measure the participants' discount rate, we gave participants 13 choices. Each choice was between $\$x$ today and $\$(1 + r)x$ in two weeks. In the experiment, x did not vary and equaled their final earnings (excluding the show-up fee) whereas r ranged from 0 to 0.12 in steps of 0.01. Once they made their choices, one value of r was selected at random to determine when and how much each participant was paid. Participants who chose the early payment received a check with their earnings a couple of hours later. Participants who chose the late payment received their check two weeks later. All checks were delivered to the participants' mailbox during days in which participants were present due to compulsory classes.

In the paper, we use the value of r at which participants switch from the early to the late payment as each participant's discount rate. None of the participants switched from late to early payment. Note that, since x equaled the participants' earnings in a randomly chosen part of the experiment, these choices were completed only by participants who earned a positive amount. For the purpose of the regressions reported in the paper, we assigned the mean discount rate to the participants who did not complete these choices. In this way, their inclusion does not bias the effect of the discount rate for participants who did complete them.

Trust and reciprocity

To measure trust and reciprocity, participants played a variation of the investment game of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Specifically, a first mover is endowed with \$50 and decides how much to send, $s \in \{0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50\}$, to the second mover. The second mover receives three times s and decides how much to return, $r \in [0, 3s]$, to the first mover. The earnings of the first mover equal $50 - s + r$ and those of the second mover $3s - r$.

Each participant played the game twice, first as the first mover and then as the second mover. Pairs were re-matched so that participants played with a different randomly selected participant. Second-mover decisions were collected with the strategy method. Namely, before knowing s, second movers specified how much they would return for each possible value of s.

In the paper, we use the faction sent, $s/50$, as a participant's measure of trust, and the fraction returned if the first mover sends \$50, $r/150$, as a participant's measure of reciprocity.

Cooperation

To measure their willingness to cooperate, participants played a variation of the design used by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001). Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to groups of eight, given an endowment of \$50, and were asked to make two contribution decisions to a linear public good game: an "unconditional" decision and a "conditional" decision. For their unconditional decision, each participant i indicated whether he/she is willing to contribute $c_i \in \{0, 50\}$ to the public good. For their conditional decision, each participant i indicated whether he/she is willing to contribute $c_i(x) \in \{0, 50\}$ given that $x \in \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7\}$ other group members contribute 50. To determine the final contributions to the public good, seven unconditional decisions were selected at random and were used to determine the conditional decision of the remaining group member. Participant i's earnings equaled $50 - c_i + 0.3 \times \sum_j c_j$.

In the paper, we use the unconditional contribution as a participant's willingness cooperate.

SM1.3. Instructions of the sums tasks

This game is divided into 4 periods. At the beginning of the game, you will be divided into groups of four. The participants in your group will be the same throughout the 4 periods.

In each of the first 3 periods, you will be given a series of *addition tasks* (sums of four 2-digits numbers like the one below). You will have 150 seconds to answer as many questions as you want. The computer will record the number of sums that you answer correctly. You may use paper and pencil but you *cannot* use a calculator. In each period, the rules for the payment are different and will be explained in detail before the start of the respective period.

One of the 4 periods will be randomly selected by the computer to determine your earnings for Game 3. In addition, after period 4 there will be a bonus section consisting of four questions. Any money earned in the bonus section will be added to this experiment's earnings.

Instructions for the piece-rate period

In this period, you will be paid \$4 for each correct answer you give.

Example: If you answer 6 questions correctly, your earnings for period 1 equal $24. Remember, you can write down the numbers on a piece of paper but you *cannot* use a calculator.

Instructions for the tournament period

In this period, you will compete against the other *three participants* in your group. Your payment is contingent on you having the highest number of correct answers. You will be paid *$16* for each correct answer if you have the *highest* number of correct answers in your group. If you do not have the highest number of correct answers, you will earn *$0* in this period. If there are two or more group members tied in first place, one of them will be randomly selected to be paid $16 for each correct answer (the others are paid $0). Note that all group members will face the same difficulty. That is, everyone will face the same sequence of numbers.

Example: Suppose that the other three participants in your group answer 5, 9, and 12 questions correctly. If you answer 11 questions correctly, your earnings in this period would equal $0. If you answer 13 questions correctly, your earnings in this period would equal $208. Remember, you can write down the numbers on a piece of paper but you *cannot* use a calculator.

Instructions for the choice period

In this period, you will replay the same game but you choose the rule according to which you will be paid. You can be paid with Rule 4 or with Rule 16:

- *Rule 4:* If you choose this rule, you will be paid $4 for each correct answer regardless of what others do.
- *Rule 16:* If you choose this rule, you will be paid according to your performance relative to the performance of the other three group members. You will earn $16 for each correct answer if you have more correct answers than the other group members had in period 2. If you do not have more correct answers than the other group members had, you will earn $0 in this period. If you tie in first place, a random draw will determine whether you are paid $16 for each correct answer or $0.

Remember, you can write down the numbers on a piece of paper but you *cannot* use a calculator.

Instructions for the uncompetitive choice period

In this period, you do not have to repeat the addition task but you have the choice to be paid *again* for your period 1 performance in two ways. You can choose to be paid according to Rule 4 or to Rule 16.

- *Rule 4:* If you choose this rule, you will be paid $4 for each question answered correctly in period 1 regardless of what others did.
- *Rule 16:* If you choose this rule, you will be paid $16 for each correct answer in period 1 if you have more correct answers than the other three group members had in period 1. If you did not have more correct answers than the other group members had, you will earn $0 in this period. If you tie in first place, a random draw will determine whether you are paid $16 for each correct answer or $0.

Recall that in period 1 you correctly answered *XX questions*. Note that this choice determines your period 4 earnings; it does not affect your earnings from period 1.

Instructions to elicit the participants' expected rank in each period

In this screen, we would like you to estimate your performance relative to that of other three players. For each of the first three periods, indicate whether you think you ranked first, second, third or fourth. You will receive *$2* for every period in which you correctly estimate your rank. In case of a tie, you will receive the $2 if there is a way of resolving the tie that makes your estimate correct.

Example: Suppose that in period 1 you had 8 correct answers and the other three group members had 6, 8, and 11 correct answers. You would receive $2 if you guess that your rank is second or third in period 1.

SM2. Selection into the sample

In this section, we evaluate whether the 409 participants for whom we can analyze their earnings data differ from the 129 participants for whom we cannot. Table SM1 presents the means and standard deviation of the variables in Table 1 for the participants who are in our sample and those who are not. For each variable, the table also displays the *p*-value obtained when we test whether the

Table SM1 - Comparing participants who are in our sample to those who are not

	WITHIN SAMPLE		NOT IN SAMPLE		
	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	*p*-value
Experiment and survey					
Fraction choosing tournament pay	0.521	0.500	0.512	0.502	0.867
Probability of ranking 1st in tournament	0.255	0.285	0.231	0.263	0.391
Probability of ranking 1st in piece-rate	0.254	0.287	0.240	0.264	0.611
Expected rank in tournament	2.259	0.943	2.333	0.955	0.450
Risk aversion coefficient	4.740	4.412	3.870	4.794	0.074
Discount rate	0.051	0.044	0.049	0.044	0.718
Trust	0.383	0.299	0.343	0.289	0.183
Reciprocity	0.363	0.204	0.333	0.199	0.151
Cooperation	0.330	0.471	0.293	0.457	0.436
CRT	2.438	1.331	2.434	1.351	0.979
Empathy eyes test	0.746	0.099	0.738	0.101	0.469
Self-efficacy	4.115	0.828	4.078	1.020	0.705
Fraction religious	0.469	0.500	0.419	0.495	0.312
Administrative					
Fraction of women	0.301	0.459	0.341	0.476	0.388
Age	28.221	2.444	28.928	2.721	0.009
Fraction non-white	0.550	0.498	0.643	0.481	0.062
GMAT Quantitative percentile	81.911	12.810	80.837	16.056	0.489
GMAT Verbal percentile	88.017	11.447	85.310	12.753	0.033
GMAT Analytic percentile	71.909	21.751	68.696	22.633	0.184
Fraction US residents	0.768	0.423	0.744	0.438	0.584
Fraction married	0.257	0.437	0.217	0.414	0.362
GPA	3.329	0.342	3.184	0.417	0.002
Pre-MBA work experience	60.779	24.462	64.770	26.396	0.134
Fraction with pre-MBA job in finance	0.291	0.456	0.264	0.442	0.548
Fraction with pre-MBA job in consulting	0.286	0.452	0.217	0.424	0.124

two groups of participants significantly different from each other. Specifically, we use simple *t*-tests for the continuous variables and χ^2 tests for categorical variables.

By and large, we find no significant differences between the participants who are in our sample and those who are not. Using a significance threshold of 5% results in significant differences in age (participants in the sample are younger), the GMAT verbal percentile (participants in the sample have higher percentiles), and GPA (participants in the sample have higher scores). Using a significance threshold of 10% adds risk aversion to the list (participants in the sample are more risk averse) and race (participants in the sample are more likely to be white). However, if we adjust *p*-

values with the Benjamini-Hochberg method to account for multiple comparisons then the only variable that shows a significant difference using a 10% threshold is GPA. Importantly for this paper, neither the fraction of women nor the fraction of participants who chose the tournament is significantly different. Moreover, if we test whether the fraction of men who chose the tournament differs between those who are in our sample and those who are not, we do not find a statistically significant difference (p = 0.794), and the same is true for the fraction of women who chose the tournament (p = 0.704).

Finally, to test whether taste for competition differs between participants who are in our sample and those who are not, we run an OLS regression using the payment choice in the sums task as the dependent variable. In line with the regressions in Table 2, as independent variables we include the participants' probability of ranking 1st under the tournament, the difference in the probability of ranking 1st between tournament and piece-rate pay, the participants' expected rank under the tournament, their risk aversion coefficient, and a dummy variable indicating whether a participant is in our sample or not. We find that the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable is very small (0.006) and is not statistically significant (p = 0.893).

SM3. Determinants of earnings (complete regressions)

Table SM2 shows the regressions reported in Table 3 including the coefficients of all the control variables as well as the constant term. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the log of the participants' earnings in their first-year after graduation. In order to properly evaluate the change of the gender coefficient due to the inclusion of the tournament variable (i.e., compare the coefficients in columns I and II and columns III and IV), we include the other determinants of choosing the tournament in all regressions. Column I includes gender as an independent variable. Column II adds the tournament variable. Column III does not include the tournament variable but includes all the remaining variables in Table 1 as controls. Finally, column IV includes both the tournament variable and the control variables from Table 1. Note that, to facilitate the coefficients' interpretation, all ordinal independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

Table SM2 – Determinants of earnings

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' log of total earnings in their first year after graduation. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	I	II	III	IV
Woman	−0.122***	−0.110***	−0.097***	−0.087**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Competitive		0.091***		0.088**
		(0.035)		(0.035)
Probability of ranking 1st in tournament	0.014	0.019	−0.001	0.003
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Probability of ranking 1st in piece-rate	−0.016	−0.030	−0.019	−0.028
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Expected rank in tournament	0.001	0.015	0.001	0.015
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Risk aversion coefficient	0.001	0.008	−0.007	−0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Discount rate			−0.002	−0.001
			(0.016)	(0.016)
Trust			−0.019	−0.023
			(0.017)	(0.017)
Reciprocity			−0.005	−0.004
			(0.017)	(0.016)
Cooperation			−0.034	−0.035
			(0.033)	(0.033)
CRT			0.017	0.020
			(0.019)	(0.019)
Empathizing			0.030*	0.028*
			(0.016)	(0.016)
Self-efficacy			0.004	0.004
			(0.016)	(0.016)
Religious			−0.080***	−0.084***
			(0.031)	(0.031)
Age			−0.007	−0.009
			(0.024)	(0.024)
Non-white			0.006	0.001
			(0.034)	(0.034)
GMAT Quantitative percentile			0.015	0.009
			(0.019)	(0.019)
GMAT Verbal percentile			−0.005	−0.004
			(0.018)	(0.018)

Table SM2 – Determinants of earnings (continued)

	I	II	III	IV
GMAT Analytic percentile			0.021	0.024
			(0.017)	(0.017)
US resident			0.000	0.001
			(0.041)	(0.040)
Married			0.099**	0.093**
			(0.039)	(0.039)
GPA			0.032*	0.031*
			(0.018)	(0.018)
Pre-MBA work experience			0.004	0.006
			(0.023)	(0.023)
Pre-MBA job in finance			0.028	0.025
			(0.039)	(0.038)
Pre-MBA job in consulting			–0.036	–0.039
			(0.039)	(0.039)
Constant	12.006***	11.955***	12.025***	11.984***
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Obs.	409	409	409	409
R^2	0.032	0.048	0.122	0.136

SM4. Determinants of earnings (additional analysis)

SM4.1. Uncompetitive tournament

In this section, we analyze the effect of choosing tournament without having to perform under competitive conditions. Recall that, like in the third period of the experiment, in the fourth period participants had to choose whether they wanted to be compensated for their previous performance according to the piece-rate or tournament payment schemes. Unlike in the third period, however, they did not have to perform the adding task again and their decision applied to their previous piece-rate performance. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) argue that this decision is akin to a choice between a certain payoff and a lottery with ambiguous probabilities and is not affected by the participants' attitudes towards competition. If this is the case, it is interesting to analyze whether this variable is also a good predictor of the participants' earnings at their first job and whether it accounts for some of the observed gender gap in earnings.

Like with the choice of tournament in the third period, we first analyze whether there is a gender gap in choosing tournament in the fourth period. Overall, 47.2% of male MBAs chose tournament in

Table SM3 – Determinants of earnings with uncompetitive tournament pay

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' log of total earnings in their first year after graduation. All regressions include controls for the choices between tournament and piece-rate that are unrelated to taste for competition. Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. The change in coefficient for woman refers to the percentage change from column I (III) in Table 3 to columns I or III (II or IV) in this table; bootstrapped *p*-values for this change are provided in the next row. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	I	II	III	IV
Woman	−0.116***	−0.096**	−0.108***	−0.088**
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Uncompetitive tournament pay	0.054	0.051	0.027	0.024
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Competitive tournament pay			0.082**	0.082**
			(0.037)	(0.038)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Change in coefficient for woman	4.8%	3.3%	11.2%	10.5%
Bootstrap *p*-value	0.104	0.199	0.020	0.048
Obs.	409	409	409	409
R^2	0.038	0.120	0.049	0.130

the fourth period compared to only 25.2% of female MBAs. This gap is somewhat smaller than the gap in tournament in the third period (26.8% vs. 22.0%) but it is nonetheless large and statistically significant (χ^2 test, $p < 0.001$). That being said, unlike the gender gap in tournament in the third period, this gender gap does not persist once we control for the participants' ability, beliefs, risk preferences, demographic characteristics, and psychological traits. That is, if we run a regression with the choice of tournament in the fourth period as the dependent variable and the same independent variables as column IV of Table 2, we obtain a gender coefficient that is smaller than the one in Table 2 (−0.064) and that is not statistically significant ($p = 0.236$).

Next, we evaluate whether the participants' choice of tournament in the fourth period is associated with their earnings in their first job. To do so, we run linear regressions with the log of their first-year earnings as the dependent variable. As in Table 3, in all specifications, we control for the variables in column III of Table 2. The results are presented in Table SM3. Columns I and II are comparable to columns II and IV in Table 3. As independent variables, they include gender, a dummy variable indicating whether participants chose tournament in the fourth period (uncompetitive tournament), in the case of column IV, all the remaining control variables from Table 1. We can see

Table SM4 – Summary statistics by gender for negotiation and competing offers

	Men		Women		
	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	*p*-value
Number of competing job offers	0.420	0.824	0.407	0.808	0.882
Compensation of best competing offer	178k	117k	144k	51k	0.036

that the coefficients for uncompetitive tournament are positive. However, they are about half as large as the comparable coefficient of competitive tournament, and they are not statistically different from zero in either regression ($p > 0.125$). In addition, the inclusion of the uncompetitive tournament dummy produces a much smaller and non-significant change in the gender coefficient.

In columns III and IV, in addition to uncompetitive tournament, we also include the dummy variable indicating whether participants chose tournament in period three (competitive tournament). As we can see, the coefficient for competitive tournament is both economically and statistically significant ($p < 0.031$) whereas the coefficient for uncompetitive tournament is now close to zero and far from statistical significance ($p > 0.479$).

SM4.2. Competing job offers

Here we analyze the effects of having competing job offers. As part of the data we received from the career services office, we know whether participants reported having competing job offers and their respective earnings. Table SM4 presents the means and standard deviation for these variables by gender as well as the *p*-value obtained when testing for differences between men and women. Men and women both receive about the same amount of competing job offers but conditional on having at least one competing job offer, men receive competing job offers with higher earnings.

Are competing job offers associated with the participants' earnings in the first job after graduation? To answer this question, we reran the regressions in columns III and IV of Table 3 but included these variables as additional independent variables. Specifically, we included a dummy variable that equals one if the participant had at least one competing job offer, and the log of the earnings of the best competing offer, which we standardized to have an average equals zero and a standard deviation of one in order to facilitate the interpretation of the previous dummy variable. The results are presented in Table SM5.

Table SM5 – Determinants of earnings controlling for competing offers

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' log of total earnings in their first year after graduation. All regressions include controls for the choices between tournament and piece-rate that are unrelated to taste for competition. Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. The change in coefficient for woman refers to the percentage change from column III in Table 3 to each column in this table; bootstrapped *p*-values for this change are provided in the next row. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	I	II	III	IV
Woman	–0.066**	–0.029	–0.060*	–0.022
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Received a competing job offer	0.094***	0.131***	0.097***	0.136***
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.037)
Received a competing job offer × Woman		–0.157**		–0.159**
		(0.069)		(0.069)
Compensation of best competing offer	0.266***	0.275***	0.260***	0.268***
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Compensation of best competing offer × Woman		–0.108		–0.099
		(0.074)		(0.074)
Competitive			0.063**	0.062*
			(0.032)	(0.032)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Change in coefficient for woman	32.9%	70.5%	39.3%	77.5%
Bootstrap *p*-value	0.035	0.002	0.015	0.001
Obs.	409	409	409	409
R^2	0.309	0.320	0.316	0.327

First, let us concentrate on column I, which includes all the control variables in Table 1 but does not include the competitive dummy variable. We can see that competing job offers are strongly associated with significantly higher earnings. Specifically, receiving a competing job offer with earnings of $168k is associated with a 9.4% increase in the earnings of the offer the participant ended up taking. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in the earnings of the best competing offer increases the participants' final earnings by 26.6% (approximately $45k). In addition to affecting earnings, competing offers substantially reduce the gender gap: including these three variables decreases the magnitude of the gender coefficient by 32.9% (from –0.122 to –0.066, $p = 0.035$).

In column II, we investigate whether the effect of competing job offers differs by gender. To do so, we interact the two variables in column I with gender. Interestingly, men appear to benefit much more from competing job offers than women. First, receiving a competing job offer with earnings of

$168k significantly increases the final earnings of men but not the earnings of women. Second, a one standard deviation increase in the earnings of the competing job offer is associated with a 27.5% increase in the final earnings of men but with only a 16.7% increase in the final earnings of women. These findings are consistent with the literature on gender differences in negotiations (Babcock & Laschever, 2003) and suggest that these differences could play an important role in explaining the gender gap in earnings. That being said, the association between earnings and competing job offers can be driven by many other factors. In particular, obtaining high earnings from one firm and a competing job offer with high earnings from another firm can be due to qualities of the job candidate that are not captured by the other control variables and have nothing to do with the improved bargaining position that the competing job offer provides.

Does the inclusion of the variables for competing offers affect the impact of taste for competition? As we can see in columns III and IV of Table SM5, the inclusion of these variables weakens the coefficient of taste for competition from 8.8% to 6.3% in column III (p = 0.048) and 6.2% in column IV (p = 0.051). Moreover, they also weaken the impact of taste for competition on the gender coefficient.

We further investigate the relation between taste for competition and competing offers by running two regressions. In both cases, we include taste for competition as an independent variable as well as the variables in column III of Table 2 to control for other determinants of choosing tournament. In the first regression, the dependent variable equaled the number of competing job offers obtained by each participant. Taste for competition is not significantly associated with the number of competing job offers (p = 0.732). In the second regression, the dependent variable equaled the log of earnings of the best competing job offer (conditional on receiving at least one competing offer). In this case, we do find a significant association with taste for competition. Specifically, among participants who had competing job offers, choosing tournament is associated with a competing job offer with 17.4% higher earnings, which amounts to approximately $29k ($p$ = 0.041). Given this positive association, it is not surprising that the coefficient of taste for competition is smaller in the regressions in Table SM5 as part of the effect of taste for competition is being channeled through the earnings of the competing job offers.

Table SM6 – Determinants of earnings controlling for negotiation

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' log of total earnings in their first year after graduation. All regressions include controls for the choices between tournament and piece-rate that are unrelated to taste for competition. Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. The change in coefficient for woman refers to the percentage change from column III in Table 3 to each column in this table; bootstrapped *p*-values for this change are provided in the next row. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	II	IV
Woman	–0.099***	–0.089**
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Successfully negotiated job offer	0.015	0.014
	(0.048)	(0.048)
Competitive		0.090**
		(0.036)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Change in coefficient for woman	0.2%	10.0%
Bootstrap *p*-value	0.439	0.054
Obs.	409	409
R^2	0.115	0.130

In summary, these findings suggest that competitive participants generally obtain job offers with higher earnings, both from the firm at which they end up working and from competing firms.

SM4.3. Negotiation

An important difference between men and women is men's higher willingness and ability to bargain for a better wage (e.g., Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Small et al. 2007; Exley, Niederle, and Vesterlund, 2015; Leibbrandt and List, 2015). We have one variable that can speak to this. Namely, the career services office asks participants to indicate whether a particular job offer was the outcome of a successful negotiation. Compared to men, women are slightly less likely to have negotiated their final job offer but the difference is not statistically significant (8.1% vs. 13.3%, $p = 0.137$).

We investigate the effect of negotiation on earnings in Table SM6. The table presents regressions like the ones in columns III and IV of Table 3 including a dummy variable that equals one if the participant successfully negotiated his/her job offer as an additional independent variable. We can see that participants who indicated that they successfully negotiated their job offer did not receive

higher earnings (p = 0.750). The inclusion of this variable, moreover, has no impact on the gender coefficient. Controlling for having successfully negotiated one's job offer also has no discernable effect on the coefficient for taste for competition, which increases slightly to 9.0%. Lastly, we also ran a regression with successful job negotiation as the dependent variable and with taste for competition as well as the variables in column III of Table 2 as the independent variables. We do not find a significant association between successful job negotiation and taste for competition (p = 0.856).

SM4.4. Social contacts

Another potential contributor to the gender gap is the difference in the social networks of men and women. In particular, men tend to have larger and more widely dispersed social networks (e.g., see Brass, 1985; Ibarra, 1992), which are arguably more useful for finding jobs (Montgomery, 1991). We evaluate the impact of social networks by looking at the source of the participants' first job. Most participants found their job through the business school's career services office. However, a small percentage found their through their social contacts (9.4% of men and 5.7% of women).

We investigate the effect of finding a job through one's social contacts on earnings in Table SM7. The table presents regressions like the ones in columns III and IV of Table 3 including the source of the job (social contact vs. career services) as an additional independent variable. As we can see, individuals who obtained their job through their social contacts received substantially higher earnings (around 21% more) than those who obtained their job through the career services office. The inclusion of this variable, however, has only a modest effect on the magnitude of the gender coefficient. It reduces it from 9.7% to 9.1% but the reduction is not statistically significant. Moreover, controlling for having obtained one's job though social contacts has no discernable effect on the coefficient for taste for competition, which remains unchanged at 8.8%.

Lastly, we also ran a regression with the source of the participants' job as the dependent variable and with taste for competition as well as the variables in column III of Table 2 as the independent variables. We do not find a significant association between finding a job through one's social contacts and taste for competition (p = 0.766).

Table SM7 – Determinants of earnings controlling for social contacts

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' log of total earnings in their first year after graduation. All regressions include controls for the choices between tournament and piece-rate that are unrelated to taste for competition. Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. The change in coefficient for woman refers to the percentage change from column III in Table 3 to each column in this table; bootstrapped *p*-values for this change are provided in the next row. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	II	IV
Woman	–0.091**	–0.081**
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Obtained job through social contacts	0.207***	0.205***
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Competitive		0.088**
		(0.035)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Change in coefficient for woman	8.3%	17.9%
Bootstrap *p*-value	0.105	0.021
Obs.	409	409
R^2	0.146	0.160

SM4.4. Other robustness checks

In this section, we provide three additional robustness checks. First, we check whether the results are robust to the exclusion of first-year bonuses (e.g., relocation, signing, and year-end bonuses) from the participants' earnings. Second, we show the results we obtain if we use non-winsorized earnings. Third, we reran the analysis using earnings in dollars instead of logs.

Exclusion of first-year bonuses

As mentioned in the section 3.3, the information on financial earnings includes the participants' salaries, recurring yearly bonuses, which are paid every year, and first-year bonuses, which in principle are paid once during the participants first year at the job (e.g., relocation, signing, and year-end bonuses). Since first-year bonuses might not reflect a permanent part of the participants' earnings,[1] we reran the analysis in section 6 excluding these bonuses.

[1] Although first-year bonuses are paid only once, many firms will increase their employees' salary or recurring bonuses after the first year.



Figure SM1 – Total yearly earnings excluding first-year bonuses in the first job after graduation

Figure SM1A shows the mean earnings of men and women excluding first-year bonuses. On average, male MBAs earned $122k whereas females MBA earned $112k. Compared to the participants' total earnings, this difference is somewhat smaller but nonetheless a *t*-test indicates that the gender difference in means is statistically significant (p = 0.004). Figure SM1B depicts the cumulative distributions of the participants' earnings excluding first-year bonuses. We can see that for lower income levels the difference between men and women is quite small. Noticeable differences in earnings between the genders appears once we hit the median income and grow substantially over time: at the 10th percentile men out-earn women by $3k while at the 90th percentile this difference has grown to $25k.

Table SM8 contains the same analysis reported in Table 3 but excluding the first-year bonuses. The regression in column I simply confirms that women earn significantly less than men do (6.4% less). In column II, we see that competitive participants earned significantly more than noncompetitive participants. Specifically, they earned 7.8% more, which is around $9k and larger than the effect of gender. Including the tournament variable significantly reduces the gender gap in earnings by 16.2% (the gender coefficient changes from –0.064 to –0.054, p = 0.015).

In column III, we see the impact of all the variables in Table 1 except for tournament on the gender coefficient. Including these control variables reduces the magnitude and statistical significance of the

Table SM8 – Determinants of earnings without first-year bonuses

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' log of earnings in their first year after graduation excluding first-year bonuses. All regressions include controls for the choices between tournament and piece-rate that are unrelated to taste for competition (see column III of Table 2). Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. The change in coefficient for woman refers to the percentage change from column I (III) in Table 3 to columns I or III (II or IV) in this table; bootstrapped *p*-values for this change are provided in the next row. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	I	II	III	IV
Woman	−0.064**	−0.054*	−0.040	−0.031
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Competitive		0.078***		0.082***
		(0.029)		(0.029)
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Change in coefficient for woman	16.2%		22.5%	
Bootstrap p-value	0.015		0.038	
Obs.	409	409	409	409
R^2	0.016	0.034	0.091	0.110

gender coefficient, which changes from–0.064 to –0.040. Thus, like with total earnings, the single experimental measure of taste for competition explains around half as much of the gender gap in earnings as our rich set of control variables. In column IV, we see the effects of taste for competition while controlling for the other variables in Table 1. We can see that the control variables do not weaken the coefficient of taste for competition, and in fact, they strengthens it slightly to 8.2%. Moreover, the inclusion of this variable further reduces the magnitude of the gender coefficient by roughly the same amount as before (it changes from –0.040 to –0.031, $p = 0.038$).

In summary, excluding first-year bonuses from the participants' earnings does not alter our main conclusions that taste for competition is positively associated with earnings, helps explain part of the gender gap in earnings, and accounts for variation that is not captured by standard explanatory variables.

Non-winsorized earnings

For our analysis in the paper, we winsorized the participants earnings at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The reason we did this because a couple of the participants received a very high earnings that had a

Table SM9 – Determinants of earnings without winsorizing

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' log of total earnings in their first year after graduation. All regressions include controls for the choices between tournament and piece-rate that are unrelated to taste for competition (see column III of Table 2). Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. The change in coefficient for woman refers to the percentage change from column I (III) in Table 3 to columns I or III (II or IV) in this table; bootstrapped *p*-values for this change are provided in the next row. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	I	II	III	IV
Woman	−0.137***	−0.123***	−0.117***	−0.105**
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Competitive		0.104***		0.106***
		(0.040)		(0.040)
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Change in coefficient for woman	10.1%		9.8%	
Bootstrap p-value	0.011		0.037	
Obs.	409	409	409	409
R^2	0.033	0.049	0.109	0.125

strong effect on the average statistics and hence posed challenges for the statistical analysis. In Table SM9, we redid the analysis reported in Table 3 but without winsorizing the participants' earnings.

We can see from column I that without winsorizing, the gender gap in earnings grows to 13.7% (from 12.2% in Table 3). In column II, we see that without winsorizing, the effect of taste for competition also increases and is now 10.4% (compared to 9.1% in Table 3). As in Table 3, including tournament significantly reduces the magnitude of the gender coefficient (from −0.137 to −0.123, $p = 0.011$).

The conclusions drawn from columns III and IV are also unchanged with non-winsorized values. Including the control variables from Table 1 reduces the magnitude of the gender coefficient from−0.137 to −0.117, which is around twice as much as the effect of the single measure of taste for competition. Moreover, the inclusion of the control variables does not weaken the coefficient of taste for competition, which remains at 10.6%, or its impact on the gender coefficient, which changes from −0.117 to −0.105 ($p = 0.037$).

Table SM10 – Determinants of earnings without logs

Note: Regressions of the MBAs' total earnings in their first year after graduation (in thousands). All regressions include controls for the choices between tournament and piece-rate that are unrelated to taste for competition (see column III of Table 2). Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. The change in coefficient for woman refers to the percentage change from column I (III) in Table 3 to columns I or III (II or IV) in this table; bootstrapped *p*-values for this change are provided in the next row. OLS estimates and standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	I	II	III	IV
Woman	−28.170***	−25.165***	−24.889**	−22.306**
	(9.001)	(9.023)	(9.776)	(9.756)
Competitive		22.652**		23.759**
		(9.045)		(9.184)
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Change in coefficient for woman	10.7%		10.4%	
Bootstrap p-value	0.014		0.041	
Obs.	409	409	409	409
R^2	0.026	0.041	0.099	0.114

Earnings without taking logs

As is common in the literature, we performed the regressions in the paper using the log of the participants' earnings. In Table SM10, we redid the analysis reported in Table 3 but without taking logs to ensure that our results hold with these alternative specifications. Column I shows that in dollar terms the gender gap in earnings amounts to $28.2k. In column II, we see that participants who chose tournament earn $22.7k more than participants who chose piece-rate pay. As in Table 3, including tournament significantly reduces the magnitude of the gender coefficient by 10.7% (from –$28.2k to –$25.2k, $p = 0.014$). In column III we see that the inclusion of the control variables from Table 1 reduces the magnitude of the gender coefficient by 11.6% (i.e., from –$28.2k to –$24.9k), which is around the same effect of the single measure of taste for competition. Lastly, the inclusion of the control variables does not weaken the coefficient of taste for competition, which increase to $23.8k, or its impact on the gender coefficient, which is reduced by 10.4% (i.e., from –$24.9k to –$22.3, $p = 0.041$).

SM5. Determinants of selection into industries (complete regressions)

Table SM11 shows the multinomial probit regressions reported in Table 4 including the marginal effects of all the control variables. The dependent variable is the participants' industry at graduation or in the present day (seven years later). The independent variables are: gender, a dummy variable indicating the choice of tournament over piece-rate pay, other determinants of choosing tournament (see column III of Table 2), and the remaining control variables in Table 1. To facilitate the interpretation of marginal effects, all ordinal independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

Table SM11 – Marginal effects of all variables on the fraction of participants working in each industry

Note: Marginal effects of all variables on the fraction of participants working in each industry at graduation and in the present day (seven years later). Marginal effects are estimated from multinomial probit regressions of the participants' industry. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	INDUSTRY AT GRADUATION			PRESENT DAY INDUSTRY		
	Consulting	Finance	Other	Consulting	Finance	Other
Woman	0.155***	-0.241***	0.086	0.102**	-0.214***	0.113*
	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.068)
Competitive	0.071	0.043	-0.115**	0.076**	-0.006	-0.070
	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Risk aversion coefficient	0.047**	-0.073***	0.026	0.021	-0.044	0.023
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Probability of ranking 1st in	-0.041	0.102**	-0.061	-0.022	0.048	-0.026
Tournament	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Probability of ranking 1st in	0.024	-0.107***	0.083**	0.018	-0.026	0.008
piece-rate	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.017)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Expected rank in tournament	-0.014	0.007	0.007	-0.002	-0.017	0.019
	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Discount rate	-0.011	-0.000	0.012	0.010	-0.001	-0.010
	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Trust	0.005	0.010	-0.015	-0.009	-0.028	0.037
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Reciprocity	0.021	-0.038	0.017	0.028*	-0.042	0.015
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Cooperation	0.019	-0.070	0.051	-0.031	-0.061	0.093
	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.025)	(0.060)	(0.059)
CRT	0.007	-0.016	0.010	0.000	-0.021	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.033)

Table SM11 – Marginal effects of all variables on the fraction of participants working in each industry (continued)

	Industry at graduation			Present day industry		
	Consulting	Finance	Other	Consulting	Finance	Other
Empathizing	0.018	0.003	-0.022	-0.004	-0.004	0.008
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Self-efficacy	0.006	-0.036	0.030	0.016	-0.018	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Religious	0.054	-0.106*	0.052	0.077**	-0.068	-0.009
	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Age	0.025	0.017	-0.041	0.010	0.022	-0.032
	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Non-white	-0.039	0.071	-0.032	-0.040	0.086	-0.046
	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.060)	(0.059)
GMAT Quantitative percentile	0.002	0.013	-0.015	0.013	-0.032	0.019
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.035)
GMAT Verbal percentile	-0.007	0.057*	-0.049*	-0.000	0.025	-0.025
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.032)
GMAT Analytic percentile	0.001	0.031	-0.032	-0.004	-0.001	0.005
	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.031)
US resident	-0.003	-0.099	0.102*	0.041	-0.217***	0.176***
	(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.026)	(0.069)	(0.066)
Married	-0.021)	-0.066	0.086	-0.003	-0.103	0.105
	(0.044	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.074)	(0.073)
GPA	0.046**	-0.072**	0.026	0.015	0.030	-0.045
	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Pre-MBA work experience	-0.022	-0.003	0.025	0.007	0.008	-0.015
	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Pre-MBA job in finance	-0.071	0.290***	-0.218***	0.008	0.286***	-0.294***
	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Pre-MBA job in consulting	-0.003	0.039	-0.036	0.003	0.020	-0.023
	(0.049)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.028)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Obs.		409			390	
χ^2		111.020			104.274	

SM6. Gender differences in selection into industries (additional analysis)

SM6.1. Fraction transiting from each industry at graduation to each present day industry

In this section, we test how participants transition between industries depending on gender and taste for competition. Specifically, we run a multinomial probit regression with the participants' industry

Table SM12 – Marginal effect of gender, taste for competition, and risk aversion, on the fraction of participants transitioning from each industry at graduation to each industry in the present day

Note: Marginal effects of gender, taste for competition, and risk aversion on the fraction of participants transitioning from each industry at graduation to each industry in the present day (seven years after graduation). Marginal effects are estimated from multinomial probit regressions of the participants' industry. All regressions include the variables in column III of Table 2 as determinants of choosing tournament that are unrelated to taste for competition. Controls refers to all the remaining variables in Table 1. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	PRESENT DAY INDUSTRY		
	Consulting	Finance	Other
Woman × worked in other industry at graduation	0.032	–0.052	0.020
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.068)
Woman × worked in finance at graduation	0.065	–0.189**	0.124
	(0.057)	(0.085)	(0.082)
Woman × worked in consulting at graduation	0.087	0.061	–0.148
	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.096)
Competitive × worked in other industry at graduation	0.012	–0.034	0.022
	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.067)
Competitive × worked in finance at graduation	0.090**	–0.135*	0.045
	(0.043)	(0.071)	(0.065)
Competitive × worked in consulting at graduation	0.013	0.163**	–0.176*
	(0.103)	(0.068)	(0.104)
Risk aversion coef. × worked in other industry at graduation	0.002	0.002	–0.004
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.032)
Risk aversion coef. × worked in finance at graduation	0.032	0.013	–0.045
	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Risk aversion coef. × worked in consulting at graduation	–0.024	–0.005	0.029
	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.046)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

in the present day as the independent variable. As independent variables, we use dummy variables to indicate the participants' industry at graduation, which we interact with the participants' gender, choice of tournament, and their risk aversion coefficient. In addition, we include all the control variables in Table 1. The results are reported Table SM12 as conditional marginal effects for each present day industry.

As can be seen in the table, there two interesting statistically significant effects. First, women who start their careers in finance are 18.9% less likely to stay in finance and 12.4% more likely to move to other industries. Second, competitive individuals who started their career in consulting are 16.3% more likely to transition to finance and 17.6% less likely to transition to other industries compared

Table SM13 – Marginal effect of gender, taste for competition, and risk aversion, on the fraction of participants working in each industry before starting their MBA

Note: Marginal effects of gender, taste for competition, and risk aversion on the fraction of participants working in each industry before their MBA. Marginal effects are estimated from multinomial probit regressions of the participants' industry. All regressions include the variables in column III of Table 2 as determinants of choosing tournament that are unrelated to taste for competition. Controls refers to the remaining variables in Table 1. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10.

	INDUSTRY BEFORE MBA		
	Consulting	Finance	Other
Woman	–0.062	–0.036	0.098
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.066)
Competitive	0.023	0.031	–0.054
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Risk aversion coefficient	–0.042	–0.015	0.056**
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.		409	
χ^2		78.042	

to uncompetitive individuals. Finally, there is one more statistically significant effect: competitive individuals who started their career in finance are 9% more likely to transition to consulting than uncompetitive individuals. Risk aversion had no significant effect on industry transitions.

SM6.2. Determinants of the participants' industry before their MBA

In this section, we run a multinomial probit regression to test whether gender, taste for competition, and risk aversion of significant determinants of industry selection in the job the participants had before they started their MBA. The dependent variable is the participants' industry before they started their MBA. As independent variables, we use the same variables as in Table 4. Namely, we include gender (woman), a dummy variable indicating whether participants chose tournament over piece-rate (competitive), other determinants of choosing tournament (see column III of Table 2), and all the remaining control variables from Table 1 expect the industry of the participants' employer before they began their MBA. The results are reported Table SM13 as conditional marginal effects for each industry category.

Table SM14 – Summary statistics of the job market variables by gender and payment scheme

Note: Means and standard deviations for variables obtained from the career services office. The statistics for internships include all 409 participants while the statistics for jobs include only the 206 participants who did not accept a job at the firm at which they interned. The rightmost column displays *p*-values from tests of equality of distributions between men and women (top) or between participants who chose tournament and those who chose piece-rate (bottom), based on *t*-tests for ordinal variables and χ^2 tests for categorical variables.

	MEN		WOMEN		
	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	*p*-value
Number of invitations for an internship	6.297	4.607	6.561	4.316	0.579
Number of firms participants bid for an internship	7.420	8.212	6.114	6.559	0.089
Number of interviews obtained for an internship	8.248	4.976	8.228	4.955	0.969
Fraction who got offered a job at internship firm	0.636	0.482	0.569	0.497	0.207
Fraction who accepted a job at internship firm	0.510	0.501	0.463	0.501	0.384
Number of invitations for a job	5.079	4.409	5.091	4.742	0.986
Number of firms participants bid for a job	4.550	6.164	4.970	8.795	0.728
Number of interviews obtained for a job	6.957	5.938	6.788	6.369	0.856
	TOURNAMENT		PIECE-RATE		
	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	*p*-value
Number of invitations for an internship	6.009	4.821	6.776	4.137	0.085
Number of firms participants bid for an internship	7.432	8.764	6.587	6.507	0.266
Number of interviews obtained for an internship	7.854	5.204	8.663	4.666	0.098
Fraction who got offered a job at internship firm	0.610	0.489	0.622	0.486	0.802
Fraction who accepted a job at internship firm	0.521	0.501	0.469	0.500	0.297
Number of invitations for a job	5.186	5.075	4.981	3.892	0.745
Number of firms participants bid for a job	4.686	6.817	4.683	7.388	0.997
Number of interviews obtained for a job	6.745	6.140	7.058	6.016	0.712
Number of interviews obtained for a job	6.009	4.821	6.776	4.137	0.085

We find that neither gender nor taste for competition are significant predictors of the participants' industry before their MBA (pairwise tests, $p > 0.158$ and $p > 0.422$ respectively). For risk aversion, we find that a one standard deviation increase in risk aversion implies a significant increase in the likelihood of working in other industries compared to consulting ($p = 0.048$). A similar but not statistically significant effect is seen when looking at the likelihood of working in other industries compared to finance ($p = 0.180$).

SM6.3. Job market variables by gender and payment scheme

Table SM14 presents the summary statistics for the job market depending on the participants' gender and on whether they chose tournament or piece-rate in the experiment. The statistics for internships

include all 409 participants while the statistics for jobs include only the 206 participants who did not accept a job at the firm at which they interned.

We do not observe important differences depending on the participants' gender. For both internships and jobs, male and female participants received a similar number of invitations, sent a bid to a similar number of firms, and took part in a similar number of interviews. Similarly, we do not observe important differences between participants who chose tournament and those who chose piece-rate pay. OLS regressions that control for all the variables in Table 1 confirm that taste for competition is not significantly associated to invitations, bids, interviews, or the likelihood of receiving or accepting an offer from the internship firm ($p > 0.189$).

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